What to Show the World: The Office of War Information and Hollywood, 1942-1945 by Black, Gregory D. & Koppes, Clayton R.
C A L I F O R N I A I N S T I T U T E  O F  T E C H N O L O G Y
Division of the Hwnanities and Social Sciences 
Pa sadena, California 91125 
W H A T  T O  S H O W  T H E  W O R LD: 
T HE O F F ICE O F  W A R  I NF O R M A T I O N  A N D  H O LL Y WO O D ,
1 9 4 2  - 1 9 4 5  
Clayton R, Koppes  
California Institute of  Technology 
Gregory D, Black 
University of Kansas 
Forthcoming in Journal of American History 
Not for quotation or reproduction without authors' permission, 
Social Science Working Paper 
Number 114 
March 1976 
The uneasy relationship between propaganda and democracy 
proved especially troublesome during World War II, Attempting to 
promote the Franklin D, Roosevelt administration ' s  liberal war goals, 
' 
the Office of War Information won unprecedented control over the 
content of motion pictures, The interaction between OWI and Hollywood 
is indispensable for understanding both the objectives and methods of 
the United States' propaganda campaign and the content of wartime 
entertainment films, This episode, all but ignored by historians of 
both OWI and Hollywood, offer s insights into the United State s 1 war 
ideology and the intersection of politics and mas s  culture in wartime, 
Moreover, it rais es  the question whether the Roosevelt administration's 
propaganda strategy helped undermine some of its avowed war aims,  
The chief government propaganda agency during World War II 
was the Office of War Information, formed by an executive order on 
June 13, 1942, that consolidated several prewar information agencie s ,  
OWI ' s  domestic branch handled the politically ticklish home front; its 
overs eas arm supervised all United States foreign propaganda activities ,  
except in Latin America, which remained the preserve o f  Coordinator 
1 of Inter-American Affair s  Nelson Rockefeller. President Franklin D. 
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Roosevelt instructed OW! (1) to implement a program through the press, 
radio, and motion pictures to enhance public understanding of the war, 
(2) to coordinate the war-information activities of all federal agenciel!, 
and (3) to act as the contact medium between federal agencies and the 
radio and motion picture industries, OWI director Elmer Davis, the 
popular liberal radi� commentator, insisted that OWI1s policy was to 
tell the truth, But information could not be separated from interpreta-
tion, and OW! told the truth by degrees and with particular slants. In 
� 
all important respects OW! met the criterion of a propaganda agency --
an organization designed not merely to disseminate objective information 
or to clarify issues, but to arouse support for particular symbols and 
ideas, llThe easiest way to inject a propaganda idea into most people's 
minds, ll said Davis, 11is to let it go in through the medium of an 
entertainment picture when they do not realize that they are being 
propagandized, 11 1
Around Davis clustered a heavily liberal staff that gave OWI 
one of the highest percentages of interventionist New Dealers of any 
warti.Ine agency, Two assistant directors, Pulitzer-prize writ.era 
Archibald MacLeish and Robert Sherw6od, were enthusiastic New 
Dealers; another assistant director, Milton S. Eisenhower, though 
fiscally more cautious, was a New Deal veteran. The only assistant 
director who held the New Deal at some distance was Gardner Cowle.s 
Jr,, the moderate Republican publisher of Look and newspapers in 
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Minneapolis and Des Moines, who had been recruited against his will . 
to give OW! an air of bipartisanship, Liberals permeated the second 
and third levels of the agency and included such figures as histor.ians 
Arthur M, Schlesinger Jr, and Henry Pringle, former Henry Wallace 
speech writer Jack . Fleming, novelist Leo Rosten, journ<!-list Joseph 
Barnes, financier James Warburg,. future senator Alan Cranston, and 
11China hand11 Owen Lattimore, 
2 
The Bureau of Motion Pictures in OW! was a liberal stronghold, 
Its chief, Lowell Mellett, a former Scripps.:.Howard newspaper editor 
who had been a Roosevelt aide since 1939, had headed the first prewar 
information agency, the Office of Government Reports, 110GRE11 and 
11Mellett1 s Madho'1se11 to conservative critics, OGR had as one of its 
dt1ties coordination of the government film program, In response to 
the movie industry's offer of support in mid-December 1941, Roosevelt 
also told Mellett to advise Hollywood on how it could further the war 
effort. In May 1942 Mellett established a liaison office in Hollywood 
and appointed as its head Nelson Poynter, a Scripps-Howard colleague. 
Poynter did not follow movies, but he shared his Washington boss's 
enthusiasm for the New Deal. Poynter had worked briefly for 
Rockefeller's CIAA but quit when that agency denied newsprint to a 
communist newspaper in Argentina. Assisting Poynter was a young, 
staunchly liberal reviewing staff headed by Dorothy Jones, who had 
been a research assistant for political scientist Harold Lasswell and 
OWI - 4
had done. some of the first content analyses of movies. 3
The Hollywood office became part of OWI domestic operations 
in June 1942 and began one of the agency' s  most important, and most 
controver sial, activitie s, The motion picture, said Elmer Davis, 
could be "the most powerful instrument of propaganda in the world, 
whether it tries to be or not, 11 Roosevelt believed movie s were one of 
' 
the most effective means of reaching the American public. The motion-
picture industry experienced far fewer wartime restrictions on output 
than most industries, Hollywood turned out nearly 500 pictu'res annually 
during the war, almost as many as in prewar years, and it drew 80 
million paid admis sions per week, well above the pre-1941 peak, 
Hollywood 1 s international influence far exceeded that of American r�dio
and the press ;  foreign receipts often determined whether a film made a· 
profit. Every film enhanced or diminished America' s  reputation abroad 
and hence affected the nation' s  world power, the Bureau of Motion 
Pictures believed, 4
The movie industry shared OWI' s perhaps exaggerated idea 
of its products 1 power ,  but how effectively Hollywood would cooperate 
remained unclear, From the mid -1930 s to the eve of World War II 
Hollywood was isolated from the intellectual, artistic, and political 
life of the nation as perhap s never before or since, When Mus solini ' s  
army invaded Ethiopia in 1936, an agitated friend asked a producer, 
"Have you heard any late news ?11 The excited mogul replied: "Italy 
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just banned Marie Antoinette! 1 1  Conservative busines smen and their 
banker s  ran the studios, Louis B, Mayer of Metro -Goldwyn-Mayer, 
the single most influential man in Hollywood, decorated his de sk with 
portraits of Herbert Hoover, Francis Cardinal Spellman, and Douglas 
MacArthur, The artistic, more liber"al side of the industry - - the 
directors and particularly the writer s - - felt squelched, Only Warner 
Brothers, the firm that released the most me ssage films and was the 
most receptive to Franklin Roosevelt, was known as a writer s '  studio, 
At Hollywood banquets, where the seating arrangements telegraphed 
rank in the movie colony, writers were seated above the hair dres sers 
but below the heads of publicity. The industry avoided mes sage films 
in favor of stock romances, musicals, murder mysteries, and westerns 
-- "pure entertainment1 1  in Hollywood parlance, Ethnic stereotypes 
flourished; factual accuracy was incidental, Since 1934 the self-censor ship 
of the Hays Office had cleaned up sex and profanity and taught that sin 
was always punished in the end; the movie s '  ideal world was the middle -
cla s s  America of Andy Hardy. Social-me ssage films, such as The 
Grapes of Wrath in 1940 and several films loo sely termed interventionist 
in 1939-1941, were distinguished by their rarity. "Mo st movies are made 
in the evident assumption that the audience is passive and wants to remain 
pas sive, 11 noted the film critic Jame s Agee, "Every effo rt is made to do 
all the work -- the seeing, the explaining, the understanding, even the 
feeling, 1 1  5
OWI - 6 
Hollywood preferred avoidance of is sue s ;  OW! demanded 
affirmation of New Deal liberalism for America and the world.' 
When Nelson Poynter arrived in the movie capital he found the industry 
doing little to promote the larger is sues of the war. In the summer of 
142 Hollywood had under consideration or in prnduction 213 films that 
dealt with the war in sc;>me manner, Forty percent of those  focused 
on the armed forces, usually in combat. Les s  than twenty percent 
dealt with the enemy, and n1ost of those portrayed spies and saboteurs .  
Other categorie s - - the war is sues, the United Nations, and the home 
front -·- were getting minimal attention, Even more disturbing than 
the imbalance of subjects was the way in which the subjects were treated, 
Hollywood had simply grafted the war to conventional mystery and· action 
plots or appropriated it as a backdrop for frothy musicals and flippant 
comedies , Interpretation of the war remained at a rudimentary level: 
the United States was fighting because it had been attacked, and it would 
lick all comers,  
6 
To help the industry "raise its sights, 1 1  Poynter and his staff 
wrote a "Manual for the Motion-Picture Industry" in June 1942 which 
they intended to guide the movie maker s in future projects .  The manual, 
updated through 1945, ranks as probably the most comprehensive 
statement of OWI1 s interpretation of the war. OWI liberals rejected the 
"American Century" of Tim� publisher Henry Luce and the "America 
Unlimited" of United States Chamber of Commerce President Eric 
OWI - 7
Johnston; they chafed under the compromis e s  and "pettifogging legalisms " 
of the Department of State. The war, to OW!, was not merely a struggle 
for survival but a "people ' s  war" between fascism and democracy; their s 
was the crusade of Vice President Wallace ' s  "C entury of the Common 
Man. 1 1  7
The United States fought for a new democratic world based on 
the Four Freedoms - - freedom of speech and religion and freedom from 
want and fear, The war was a people ' s  struggle, BMP emphasized, "not 
a national, cla s s  or race war , 1 1  Every person in the world had a concrete 
stake in the outcome; an·Allied victory promised all a decent standard of 
living, including a job, good housing, recreation, and health, unemploy­
ment, and old-age insurance - - in short, the world New Deal. The 
average man would also enjoy the right to participate in government, 
which suggested OWI1 s antiimperialist stance, American minorities had 
not entered Utopia, the bureau conceded; but progre s s  was pos sible only 
under democracy, and wartime gains of blacks, women, and other 
minorities  would be pres erved, A nation of united average citizens, who 
believed deeply in the cause of freedom and s acrificed willingly to promote 
8 
victory, was the hallmark of BMP1 s democracy. 
The enemy was fascism, the antithesis of democracy. The 
enemy was not the Axis leader ship nor all of the Axis -led p_eoples but 
fascist supporters anywhere - - at home as well as abroad, "Any form 
of racial discrimination or religious intolerance, special privileges of 
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any citizen are manifestations of Fascism, and should be exposed as 
such, 1 1  the manual advised, A fascist victory would entail racial 
discrimination, destruction of political rights, eradication of the 
rights of labor, and "complete regimentation of the personal life" of 
the common man. Beware of a negotiated peace, BMP warned, even 
before Roosevelt ' s  call for unconditional surrender; "there can· be no 
I 
peace until militarism and fas cism are completely wiped out. 11 When 
victory came the United Nations, eschewing national interest and 
balance-of-power politics, would build a new world "expr,es sive of the
collective will, 1 1  The BMP manual enjoyed wide distribution in 
Hollywood, with some studios reproducing the entire contents for their 
personnel, 9 Before long evidence would accumulate attesting th�
manual 1 s effect. 
The manual reflected the heavily politicized intellectual 
ferment of the 1930s. Many intellectuals had put a premium on 
commitment to some large ideal or movement; a predetermined respons e, 
not an examination of experience in its many facets, was all-important, 
The quest for commitment converged in the late 1930s with the search 
for America; the war seemed to offer that unifying commitment and it 
reduced intellectual content to an uncritical adulation of America and 
Allies , Thus BMP reviewer s  in 1942 objected to the depiction of Spanish 
Loyalist violence in Paramount1 s  For Whom the Bell Tolls, "particularly 
at this time when we must believe in the rightnes s  of our cause, 11 The 
bureau continued: 
Now it is neces sary that we see  the democratic-
fascist battle as a whole and recognize that what 
the Loyalists were fighting for is essentially the 
same thing that we are, To focus too much 
attention on the chinks in our allies 1 armor is just 
what our enemies might wish. Perhaps it is 
realistic, but it is also going to be confusing to 
A • d)' 10 mer1can au iences, 
To OWI the reality of experience threatened response, 
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Before the manual could have much effect, however, the bureau 
faced some immediate problems ,  Metro wanted to re-release the 1939 
film' The Real Glory, which dealt with the United States Army ' s  
suppression of the turn-of-the-century  Moro rebellion, but now billed as 
war between American and Japanese  troops. Philippine President Manuel 
Quezon protested vigorously, and Lowell Mellett convinced producer Sam 
Goldwyn to withdraw the picture, "Any little thing " that might exacerbate 
the desperate situation in the Far East should be avoided, the BMP head 
argued. The bureau also sent a succes sful patriotic appeal to RKO when 
it heard of the proposed re-release of Gunga Din, whose portrayal of the 
Indian people as hopeles sly poor, illiterate, and savage had caused riots 
in India when released in 1939, Metro dropped its propos ed Kim when the 
bureau objected to its glorification of British i.rrlperialism, Columbia 
OW! - 10 
sought BMP advice on its proposed "Trans-Sahara, 11 which suppos edly 
would tell why France fell and would name Mar shal Petain and Pierre 
Laval among the villains .  Mellett denounced the script as  another 
Hollywood attempt to drag the war into "a hack fictional theme, with 
a few 'mon Dieu's ' and 1 sacre _bleu1s 1  thrown in, 11 American policy 
towa'rds Petain and Laval was not yet clear and Columbia should not 
invent its own, Mellett said. Columbia dropped the project, The moral 
suasion of a government agency during wartime was often powerful. ll
But sugge stions and moral suasion were of limited use, as OW! 
discovered when it screened Twentieth Century-Fox' s. Little Tokio, 
U, S, A, Virtually everything in the film was "calculated to shiver the 
well - s ensitized spine of the Office of War Information, 11 BMP viewer s  
reported, Set in the Japanese quarter of Los Angeles, the movie grafted 
a fifth-column theme to a conventional murder mystery. Everyone of 
Japanese de scent - - "this Oriental bund" - - was bent on sabotage; only 
once did the film suggest, and then indirectly, that some Japanes e -
Americans might be loyal t o  the United States ,  The movie portrayed 
the i s s ei and nisei as trying to take over California, Such accusations 
r eminded BMP reviewer s  of the "fascist bia s "  of West Coast organizations 
who wanted Japanese -Americans ' land. In one scene the hero -detective 
bulled his way into a home without a search warrant; in another the police 
beat up Japane se " spies" they had arrested and disarmed, The s e  
activities were "not even one step removed from Gestapo methods ;  yet 
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the , , • audience is expected to be moved to wild cheers , " said the 
reviewer s ,  "Did somebody mention that we are presumably fighting 
for the preservation of the Bill of Rights ? 11 By the end of the film, 
the murder has been solved, the sabotage ring broken, and the 
Japanese -Americans marched off to detention camps, The detective ' s  
sweetheart, converted from her belief in isolationism, appeasement, 
I 
and tolerance for Japanese-Americans, implore s  patriots to save 
America. "Invitation to the Witch Hunt, 11 cried BMP, 12
Poynter appealed to the producer, Colonel Jason Joy, to make 
enough changes to 11take most of the curse  off, 11 But Joy accused 
Poynter of going soft on the Japanese and gave OWI an ultimaturp.: 
Little Tokio, U, S, A. would go out as it stood or it could be killed if 
it contradicted government policy. Poynter capitulated - - the film 
reflected government policy all too well. Twentieth C entury had received 
Army approval for the film and had rushed camera crews to "Little Tokio" 
to shoot actual footage of the evacuation, The battle of Little Tokio 
taught OW! a lesson, To inject it s propaganda ideas into feature films, 
the Hollywood bureau had to influence the studios while films were being 
produced; moreover, since the army was interested mainly in security 
not ideology, the bureau had to be the sole point of contact between the 
government and the industry. Accordingly Poynter asked the studios to 
submit their scripts to his office for review. While he had no direct 
power to demand scripts, Poynter did achieve limited cooperation, 
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Hesitantly the industry began to send its scripts to BMP reviewer s .  Of 
the major studios Warner Brother s  was the most cooperative; Paramount 
gave OWI scarcely any. Poynter had taken an unprecedented step. The 
Committee on Public Information (Creel Committee) of World War I had 
allowed films to go abroad onl� if the committe � 1 s shorts went with them, 
but George C reel appar.ently had not attempted to influence the content of 
entertainment films directly. 13
As OWI reviewers began reading scripts they found many 
problems. Particularly sensitive was the depiction of home front race 
relations. Metro ' s  Man on America ' s  Conscience refurbished Andrew 
Johnson as the hero of Reconstruction who carried out Abraham Lincoln' s 
magnanimous peace policy, Vulture-like Thaddeus Stevens fulfilled the 
need for a heavy, implicated in Lincoln Is assas sination, plying Johns .on
with liquor before his inauguration, and advocating a punitive peace, 
Like Confucian allegories in the People 1 s Republic of China, the debate 
over the film reflected more  pres entist concerns. OWI pas sed the script 
to Walter White, executive secretary of the National As sociation for the 
Advancement of Colored People, who feared the picture would reinforce 
discrimination and s ectionalism and "do e�ormous injury to morale, 11 
The black press,  the Daily Worker, and a group of Hollywood luminarie s 
r aised a chorus of protest. Louis B, Mayer dismissed the outcry as the 
work of what he called "the communist cell'' at MGM. When Mellett 
appealed to national unity, the studio at last agreed to delete the sensitive 
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references to slavery and to change Stevens into a sincere, if still 
misguided, figure. The film, released in December 1942 under the
les s emotional title T ennes see Johnson, did not entirely please OWI, 
but it demonstrated nonetheles s the influence the bureau could wield 
b d. . 1
4 y rea 1ng scripts ,  
Poynter s eized that advantage with one of the few scripts 
Paramount submitted, So Proudly We Hail, He felt the picture, a 
$2 million attempt to translate the seige of Bataan into a patriotic epic,
was excessively gloomy and the treatment of the is sue s muddled. 
Poynter suggested that one of the army nurses  headed for martyrdom 
might say: "Why are we dying ? Why are we suffering ? We thought 
we , • , could not be affected by all the pestiferous, political spots 
elsewhere in the world. We have learned a lot about epidemics and 
dis ease. • • • when a political plague broke out there [ in Manchuria] 
by invasion, we would not have been willing to do something about it, 
We had to wait until this plague spread out further and further until it 
hit Pearl Harbor, 11  He also sent a three-page outline of the chaplain ' s  
Christmas sermon in which he traced the cause of democracy from 
Jesus Christ through the "Century of the Common Man, 11 The studio 
tried to write in some of Poynter' s idea, though not in his exact words,  
When the film was released in April 1943, OWI ranked it a�ong the 
best of the war films, 15
Combat films reflected OWI's  influence probably as much as 
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any type. In·the bureau' s ideal combat movie an ethnically and 
geographically diver se  group of Americans would articulate what they 
were fighting for; they would pay due regard to the role of the Allies ; 
all branches of the armed forces would have equal importance; and 
they would face an enemy who .was formidable Lut not a superman,
Problems of tactics and is sues aros e in RKO ' s  Bombardiers, in which 
a pacifist-influenced bombardier worried about bombing innocent 
c ivilians, At OW! ' s suggestion the r evised script had the army chaplain 
introduce the concept of a just war and explain that the enemy ' s  targets 
are everywhere while the Americans 1, although admittedly not surgically 
preci s e, are limited to military targets, Occasionally the studios 
became too bold for the bureau, "War � horrible, 1 1  BMP acknowledged, 
but it nevertheles s asked PRC to "minimize the more bloody aspects" 
in Cor regidor, OW! liked reality but not too much of it, which reinforced 
Hollywood' s  inclination towards avoidance, This, even more than OWI ' s  ' 
sermonettes, vitiated many combat pictures, So Proudly We Hail 
remained chiefly a cheesecake-studded story of love on the troop carriers 
and in the fox holes. "The most sincere thing Paramount's young women 
did, 11 said Jame s Agee, "was to alter their make -up to favor exhaustion 
(and not too much of it) over prettines s  (and not too little of that). 11 Few 
feature films approached the impact of combat documentaries, such as 
John Huston' s Battle of San .. � and especially the British Desert 
V. 16ictory, 
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By the fall of 1942 films in all categories were showing OWI ' s  
imprint, whether through script review o r  application of the manual for 
the industry. The motion picture bureau praised two films released in 
1942 for filling in gaps on the home front, MGM ' s  Keeper of the Flame 
dramatized the career of a wealthy American who wanted to ·turn the 
country to fascism; to institute anti-labor, anti-Negro, anti-Semitic, 
and anti- Catholic campaigns; and to exploit the people and resources of 
the United States for himself and other s of his clas s, The BMP reviewers 
found this portrayal of  native fascism "superb and exciting. 11 Univer sal 
Pictures made Pittsburgh with the specific obj ective of showing the home 
front geared for war , Pittsburgh folded a pro-labor mes sage into a 
tempestuous love triangle composed of John Wayne, Randolph Scott, 
and Marlene Dietrich, which was ultimately s quared when labor and 
management buried the hatchet in furtherance of something greater than 
thems elves, the war effort. Some of the speeches had been "culled 
directly" from the OW! manual, the bureau observed, "and might have 
been improved by translation into terms more directly and s imply 
relating to the characters, situations and backgrounds involved in this 
particular film, 11 But OW! Hollywood reviewer s liked it nonethele s s, 
and Poynter urged Mellett not to mis s  Pittsburgh or Keeper of the Flame, 17
If the studios chose to ignore OWI, however, they c;ould turn out 
\ 
what Poynter termed "ill-conceived atrocities, 11 Comedies  based on the 
home front were particularly sensitive, as Preston Sturges ' Paramount 
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film, Palm Beach Story, illustrated. By 1942 the five -year marriage 
of socialites Tom and Gerry Jeffers has worn thin. They owe· several 
hundred thousand dollars back rent on their New York apartment, and 
Tom needs money to develop a landing net that will revolutionize 
aviation. Gerry wants to get a divorce in Pahr Beach but lacks. the
train far e. Using her long legs  to good advantage, she gets  a deaf 
industrialist to shower her with gifts and money, Enroute she .becomes 
the ma scot of the Ale and Quail Club, a group of millionaires  heading 
south, Drinking huge quantities of ale, they practice for the quail by 
making the wide-eyed, knee -knocking colored porter tos s up cracker s 
which they pulverize, along with their private railroad car, - Gerry 
flees  the Ale and Quail Club and meets another millionaire, John D, 
Hackensacker III, who takes her to Palm Beach on his yacht. He falls 
in love with Gerry, and his sister with Tom. But the giddy chase  is 
resolved happily when Gerry returns to Tom, and the Hackensacker s 
marry Tom's twin brother and Gerry's twin s ister, Palm B each Story 
carried on a long tradition of satires of the idle rich (for Hackensacker 
read Rockefeller) and ranked among the better comedies of the war. 
While the Bureau of Motion Pictures agreed that Americans would take 
the film in stride, it feared that foreigner s would believe this "libel on 
America at war" was real and that the United States '  sacrificing allies  
18would be offended, 
Another Hollywood staple that disturbed OWI was the gangster 
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film, of which Paramount ' s Lucky Jordan was representative, Lucky 
Jordan (Alan Ladd) tries to dodge the draft and swindle the army; bu� 
when Nazi agents beat µp Annie, a gin- swilling pan-handling grandmother 
who has befriended him, he is converted to the American cause, helps 
round up the Axis spy ring, and meekly returns to the army. Lucky ' s 
turnabout was fairly effective, for it placed in specific, human terms 
the reality of fascism, Yet his individualistic commitment suggested 
to OWI reviewers that the United States had nothing ideological against 
Hitler; as Lucky said, Americans just didn't like the way Nazis pushed 
people around. OWI wanted Lucky to undergo a more profound 
intellectual awakening and to announce it explicitly, as had the nur ses  
in So  Proudly W e  Hail, Moreover, OWI feared that the pervasive 
cynicism and breakdown of law and order in gangster films, while no.t 
particularly harmful at home, tended to support Axis propaganda abroad. 
Increasingly worried about the po ssible negative image of the United 
States abroad in late 1942, the Bureau of Motion Pictures wished the 
Office of Censorship would bar Palm Beach Story, Lucky Jordan, and 
other films it disliked from export, Unluckily for OW!, however, the 
c ensor ship code was limited mainly to security information, and s ince 
these  films hardly contained military secrets, the censor granted them 
export licens es.  The censor, ironically, was more lenient· than the 
19apostles of the Four Freedoms. 
OWI s earched for ways to build up its movie muscle. Hearing 
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increasingly bad reports on the reception of .American films from 
travelers abroad, such as New York Times columnist James ·R eston, 
Elmer Davis looked for a way to keep Hollywood from putting across 
"day in and day out, the most outrageous caricature of the American 
character. 11 Lowell Mellett :proposed that a r•Jpresentative of OWI1s 
overseas branch join ,the BMP Hollywood office; this official could 
more credibly object that certain films harmed foreign relations and 
could carry OWI' s case to the censor. 1 1It would hurt like hell1 1  if a 
picture were withheld from foreign distribution, Mellett pointed out, 
and films would improve for both foreign and domestic audiences. 
Davis agreed and appointed one of Robert Sherwood's chief aides, Ulric 
Bell, as the overseas arm's Hollywood representative. A former 
Washington bureau chief for the Louisville C ourier-Journal, Bell 
possessed impeccable New Deal credentials and had been one of the 
key figures in the prewar interventionist Century Group. He began 
his duties in Hollywood in November 1942 and shar ed Poynter '  s reviewing 
staff. Soon Bell's influence would exceed what Mellett and Poynter had 
20dreamed of or, indeed, thought proper. 
OW! then tried to cut in on the chummy relationship between 
Hollywood and the more glamorous armed forces, The war and navy 
departments furnished men, equipment, and advice to the compliant 
industry. The military branches scrutinized scripts and films mainly 
for security and seldom cooperated with OWI. In early December 1942, 
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as part of an overall effort to get the military to adher e  to OW! policy, 
Davis asked the war and navy departments to channel all their contacts 
with the movie industry through OWI's Hollywood office, The military 
21flatly declined. 
At the same time Mellett dispatched a hotly controversial 
l etter to the studios, He advised the industry to routinely submit 
tre.atments and synopses .of projected films, as well as finished scripts, 
to Poynter 's office, The BMP chief also asked the producers to submit 
all films to his Hollywood outpost in the long cut, the last stage before 
final prints were mad·e, While little new material could be added then, 
OW! could still recommend that harmful scenes be snipped out. More-
over, all contacts between the studios and federal agencies, including 
the military services, should be channeled through the Bureau of 
M t. p· 22 o ion ictures.
CENSORS SHARPEN AXES, bannered Variety, Mellett wanted 
Hcomplete censorship over the policy and content of our pictures, 1 1  said 
Bill Goetz, vice pr esident of Twentieth C entury, reflecting the attitude 
of nearly all studio heads. Goetz was willing to be 1 1enslaved 1 1  by a 
"great mind " like the president's, or by Hedy Lamarr or Greta Garbo, 
but he considered Mellett and Poynter unfit to interpret government 
policy. The magnates wanted an in-house censor; among those most 
often mentioned were Louis B, Mayer and Y. Frank Freeman, the 
conservative Georgian who ran Paramount, 23
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Mellett and· Davis, shocked by the industry' s furious reaction, 
tried to soothe the executives, Studios remained free to make any 
picture they wanted to without consulting anybody, and, short of 
violating treason statutes, they could distribute any picture in the 
United States ,  The main purpos e  of the letter had been to  clarify the 
relationship between OWI and the armed forces for the industry, they 
said, Privately Mellett told Poynter to pull back, Suggesting dialogue 
for So Proudly We Hail had been a mistake, Mellett said; Poynter now 
agreed, As for Pittsburgh and Keeper of the Flame, the BMP chief 
said: 11! think your pride can only re sult from the appearance of your 
own stuff in tho se two picture s ,  The propaganda sticks out ·disturbingly, 11 
Further pres sure on the industry might produce a campaign for Poynter' s 
head, Mellett warned, "Great things" had already been accomplished; 
now BMP should modify its operation in whatever ways nece ssary until 
the storm subsided, 24
In fact BMP reviewers  acknowledged decided improvement in 
the treatment of OWI theme s in pictures released or in production in 
late 1942 and early 1943, The depiction of the Allies had changed, 
Hollywood 1 s conde scending attitude towards foreigners in such films as 
Mickey Rooney 1 s Y ank at Eton and the Sonja  Henie vehicle Iceland had 
offended the Allies,  Now the movie industry began to  compensate by 
stressing the heroic Resistance, The indomitable Norwegians starred 
in Commandos Strike at D3�, a combat picture that Ulric Bell felt 
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packed 11a tremendous wallop, 11 and in Nunnally Johnson's The Moon ls 
Down. BMP liked the 1942 Academy Award winner Casablanca for its 
depiction of the valiant underground, the sense of the United State·s as 
the haven of the oppressed, and the subordination of personal desires 
to the greater cause of the war - - although they would have pr eferred 
that Rick (Humphrey Bogart) had verbalized the reasons for his 
conversion', As  OWI suggested, Fritz Lang ' s  story of Lidice, Hangmen 
Also Die, showed a united and heroic Czechoslovakia resisting German 
barbarism and eventually killing Heydrich the hangman. Jean Renoir 
and Dudley Nichols' This Land Is Mine seemed to OWI. a "superb" 
picture of Nazi oppression and French resistance, capped by the 1 1vital11 
oration of the once cowardly schoolmaster defying occupation authorities. 
Ye't, as critics such as Leo Braudy noted, the teacher for all his pas sion, 
remained "a man orating in a locked room, 11 Even in such talented hands ·  
a s  Renoir' s and Nichols ' ,  me s sage overwhelmed the creation of 
believable characters and real situations , 25 
Such problems, among others ,  counteracted OWI-
approved efforts to reverse Hollywood' s negative prewar image of the 
Soviet Union, The idea of filming Ambas s ador Joseph E ,  Davies'  ,My 
Mis sion to Mos cow apparently did not originate with OWI; Jack Warner 
claimed it was President Roo s evelt' s ,  BMP reviewer s  111ade some 
relatively minor suggestions when they read the script, which followed 
the book all too faithfully. Beneath a giant world map; the prescient 
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Davies chatted amiably with an avuncular Stalfu, illustrating how 
Americans and Russians were all brothers under the skin in the global 
struggle. (Stalin faced the camera but the film included only FDR 1 s 
voice - - an accolade Hollywood usually reserved for the Deity. ) Bell 
termed the picture "a socko ji;>b on the isolatio··1ists and appease.rs 
the boldest thing yet done by Hollywood. 11  Bold perhaps, but its 
cosmetic treatment of the occupation of Finland, whitewash of the 
Moscow purge trials, and abnormally simplistic formulae evidently 
convinced few viewers, Mission to Moscow was "mishmash, 1 1 said 
Manny Farber of.New Republic. 11A great glad two -million-dollar bowl 
of canned borscht, 1 1  sighed Agee. 26
When United Artists planned its Soviet spectacular in February 
1943, it gave the Bureau of Motion Pictures two scripts. OW! chose the 
less Americanized version. But in the translation from script to film, 
Girl From Leningrad succumbed to the usual Americanization. More 
glaring still was North Sta!', Sam Goldwyn 1 s tale of the guerrilla warfare 
a Russian village waged against its Nazi captors in 1941, Lillian Hellman's 
script had good possibilities, particularly in its semidocumentary approach 
to ordinary Russians, "We see them as people - - like ourselves, 11 said 
OW! reviewers, That was the problem. Director Lewis Milestone 
turned the Bessarabian cooperative into an American prairie town; the 
peasants became Hollywood handsome and sang and danced "as if they 
were strays from Oklahoma, "  The production so angered Miss Hellman 
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that she bought back her part of the contract for $30, 000. Prewar satires 
like Ninotchka were turned upside down. "War has put Hollywood's 
traditional conception of the Muscovites through the wringer, " observed 
Variety, "and they have come out shaved, washed, sober, good to their 
families, Rotarians, brother Elks, and 33rd Degree Mason. 11 27
If Hollywood did not Americanize foreign subj ects, it usually 
depicted th.em as hopelessly primitive. China was especially vulnerable.  
The first script of  The Keys of the Kingdom, the story of a Scottish 
Catholic missionary at the turn of the century, showed Chinese peasants 
living in filthy straw huts, a Chinese mother about to sell her daughter 
into prostitution, and a nation rent by marauding war lords. Such a 
China could never fulfill FDR 's plans for it as one of the four policemen 
of the world. Under OW! influence the straw huts became spotless brick 
dwellings, the mother gave her daughter to the priest for adoption, and 
the civil war became an ideological struggle for a modern China, 
Believers of Keys of the Kingdom might have been excused if they were 
surprised by China after World War II. 28
The motion-picture bureau was also having success in reorienting 
the portrayal of the home front. Twentieth' s One Destiny, a tale of how 
Pearl Harbor changed the lives and affections of various persons in an 
Iowa farm community, offered OW! many possibilities. The bureau 
persuaded the studio to change the original script 's emphasis on ill 
feeling between an enlisted man and a man who stayed on the farm to an 
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understanding of how the war effort needed various talents in many places. 
A machine politician was transformed into a conscientious congressman; 
and a farm grandmother came to the realization that it was not just the 
Japanese but an entire ideology that threatened democracy. The resulting 
screenplay met OWI 's desire for a movie sho,»ing the importance of 
agricultur e in the war, effort and afforded "a gratifying example of what 
can be done with a script in early stages. 11 29
Another maj or success for the bureau was its role in inj ecting 
some of the New Deal into King Vidor' s An American Romance, Originally 
titled simply but grandly America, Vidor1s picture recounted the rags-to-
riches life of a Slavic immigrant who became a great automobile 
manufacturer, sold out, and then returned to manufacture aircraft for 
the war effort. "If Henry Ford had written it, it could scarcely express 
the Ford philosophy more clearly, 11 said the bureau. The individualistic 
nature of the hero 1 s commitment troubled OWI, but other bureau-induced 
changes softened the picture sufficiently for OWI approval. Blacks, who 
in the first script had been nice but definitely to be kept in their place, 
were eliminated. Labor unions had been shown as radical violent 
conspiracies - - �'a fascist tactic pure and simple, tending to divide one 
large group of Americans from the other, 1 1  said OWI. The bureau 
convinced the producer to tone down this characterization, although he 
did not affirm the Wagner Act as they had hoped, For OWI and outside 
reviewers alike, the strong point of An American Romance was the 
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documentary-style celebration of the United States' physical attributes 
steel mills, iron mines, wheat fields -- that should convey to foreign 
. 30 audiences "the greatness of America. 1 1 
Despite the motion-picture bureau's influence on movie content, 
Ulric Bell began campaigning for a way to curb pictures he felt were still 
undesirable. The Office of Censorship issued a new code on December 
ll, 1942, that helped Bell immensely. The new index banned from export 
films that showed rationing or other economic preparations for a long 
war, scenes of lawlessness in which order was not restored and the 
offenders punished (this aimed primarily at gangster films) , and portrayals 
of labor or class conflict in the United States since 1917. B ell applauded 
the censor, for he thought Hollywood still emphasized the "sordid side of 
American life";  he wanted the code tightened even more,  Poynter 
vehemently disagreed, especially with the restrictions on post-1917 
America, If OWI' s strategy was to tell the truth, he argued, it should 
"make a sacrifice hit now and then. " Films should admit the United 
States had problems, as foreigners knew, but show how democracy solved 
them, "Fascist methods need not be used to defeat the common enemy 
of Fascism, 11 he told Bell, Poynter predicted that the new code would 
make studios shy away from significant war themes, 31 
Bell nevertheless pressed hard to bring the censor to his point 
of view, particularly as a means of trapping "B " movies that wer e often 
shot without scripts and of thwarting studios who tried to parlay military 
OWI - 26 
or FBI approval into an export license. Twent'ieth' s They Came to Blow 
Up 'America, which dealt with the seven saboteurs who landed on Long 
Island in 1942, was a case in point, The F BI saw nothing wrong with the 
script, but Bell thought the sabotage was exaggerated and the F BI was 
shown as inefficient. 1 1Even the FBI1s approva'. does not make it suitable 
for overseas pr esentation, 1 1 he said, The censor passed it anyway. Bell 
enlisted Davis's help in February 1943 for a test case, Republic's quickie 
1 1B1 1  feature, London Blackout Murders. This picture implied the British 
government would accept a negotiated peace, took some mild swipes at 
Lend-Lease, and showed an overworked doctor accidentally cut off a 
woman's head during a blackout instead of amputate her leg: The movie 
contained some "ridiculous material, 11 censorship director Byron· Price 
acknowledged; but he could not agree that 1 1suppression should go the 
lengths Bell has suggested, 11 America's allies could 1 1take it, 11 Price 
said, 1 1and the enemy would find ways to distort developments anyway. 11 ' 
RKO hid its low-budget picture I Walked With a Zombie from Bell until 
the censor granted an export license, In similar fashion other films, 
including the Bob Hope-Dorothy Lamour picaresque Road to Morocco, 
which Milton Eisenhower had said 11simpiy must not reach North Africa, 1 1  
. . d f h 
32 
wer e  spir1te out o t e country. 
In mid-summer 1943, however, Bell triumphed, Congress ' 
anti-New Deal axe chopped the OWI domestic branch to a fraction of 
its former size, Mellett and Poynter left the Bureau of Motion Pictures, 
OWI - 27 
Paramount executive Stanton Griffis took charge of what little remained· 
of BMP' s own productions, and B ell inherited the Hollywood review 
staff. Freed of Poynter 1s restraints Bell now convinced West Coast 
censor Watterson Rothacker to adopt his approach. In quick succession 
Rothacker denied foreign audiences Fugitive from a Prison·Camp, The 
Great Swindle, The Batman, Hillbilly Blitzkrieg, Sleepy Lagoon, and 
Secret Service in Darkest Africa, By fall 1943 Bell and Rothacker were 
consulting 1 1morning, noon, and night, 1 1  and the censor now followed 
OWI's recommendations in almost all cases, When negative reports on 
Lucky Jordan filtered back from Sweden, Bell reported that the censor 
almost certainly would not allow such a film to be exported now. The 
major remaining difference between OWI and the censor concerned 
westerns, such as Buffalo Bill, which dramatized whites' mistreatment 
of Indians. The film had a factual basis, Rothacker observed, and since 
it was set before 1917 he couldn't touch it, OWI had become the censor 's  
advance guard. Hollywood could still make any film it chose, but as the 
Motion Picture Herald pointed out, 1 1no one has yet advanced an argument 
in support of producing a picture known in advance to be doomed to 
d t' h'b' ' 
0 
} ' 1 II 33 omes ic ex 1 ihon exc us1ve y. 
The Bureau of Motion Picture ' s  increasing influence over a 
Hollywood willing to cooperate was apparent in movies about the home 
front. As juvenile delinquency grew the studios sensed an alluring subj ect. 
Monogram's Wher e Are Your Children? appalled BMP reviewers with its 
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" s ensational portrayal of a young girl' s downfall; youthful drunkenness ,  
orgiastic dancing and necking, a seduction resulting in pregnancy, a 
stolen car, a joy ride, a murder, an attempted suicide and the repentant 
older generation, 1 1  While the film promised something for everyone, 
OWI told Monogram to tone it down if it wanted foreign release, Mono­
gram did but not enough ,to please OWI, Following OWI recommendations 
closely, Rothacker ordered 508 feet cut from the film before he approved 
it for export. RKO's contribution to delinquency was a film whose 
progres sion of titles suggested its modification under OWI pres sure: 
Youth Runs Wild was toned down to Are These Our Children? which 
became The Dangerous Age which was released as Look to Your Children, 
who se conclusion assembled a series of "stock shots showing how the Boy 
Scouts, 4-H Clubs, city playgrounds and similar institutions are 
combatting juvenile problems, 1 1  Like sin punished in the end, democracy 
34solving its problems was ruled suitable for export, 
OWI continued to work closely with themes about the enemy, 
The script of The Strange Death of Adolf Hitler suggested that the 
assas sination of the Fuehrer would end Nazism - - a mes sage contrary 
to OWI' s interpretation, After extensive consultation with BMP, the 
studio converted the picture into an exposition of fascism that OWI 
e specially r ecommended for over seas distribution. 35
Almost all the major OW! themes converged in the most 
expensive picture made up to that time, Republican Darryl Zanuck' s  
[ p. OWI - 28a follows ] 
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hagiographic Wilson, released in August 1944. The Bureau of Motion 
Pictures worked clos ely with screenwriter Lamar Trotti to as sure its 
interpretation in this nearly three-hour -long biography of Woodrow · 
Wilson, Machine politicians were balanced by emphasizing the people's 
power, The studio excised a line to which BMP obj ected: "With Wilson 
now firmly in the saddle and riding herd on a docile Cong res s ,  • • • 11 
While the 
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original script had dwelled on the failure of the League of Nations , the
revised version held out a vision of hope, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes 
now said there were too many side issues for the people to render a 
clear decision on the League, And in the closing scene Wilson ' s  wife 
read one of her husband 1 s letters:  1 1The League isn't dead just because a few 
obstructive men now i:µ the saddle say it is ,  The dream of a world 
united against the awful waste s of war is too deeply imbedded in the hearts 
of men everywhere, 11 _This addition especially pleased OWI reviewer s, 
who believed that the American people were united in support of the 
lasting peace that wa s again attainable. OW! recommended Wilson for 
special distribution in liberated area s, not merely because its theme 
was 1 1 so  vital to  the psychological warfare of the United Nations , "- but 
because of the picture ' s  1 1rare entertainment value·. 1 1  De spite good 
intentions and a $5. 2 million budget, however,  Hollywood and OW! reduced 
a character worthy of Shake speare to 1 1an astutely played liberal as sistant 
profes sor of economics 1 1  and its ideas to primer simplicity. A s  history 
it was a travesty; as entertainment, a bore; as box-office, a bust. 36
Wilson was one of the last major films to deal significantly with 
OW! themes,  C ombat picture s,  such as Thirty Seconds Over Tokyo, held 
steady; and pictures  about the home front, such as Pride of the Marine s,  
which fulfilled OW!' s de sire for films about returning veterans, showed 
a slight increase. But the other OW! categories showed sharp declines , 
The 1944 Academy Award winner, Bing Crosby' s Going My Way, 
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represented the shift to non-ideological, frequently religious,  entertain.; 
.
ment pictures  in which war and rumor s  of war s eldom intruded, Several 
rea sons contributed to this shift, among them increasing wa_r wearines s  
and a sense that the war would end soon, But another important cause 
of the decline was what Nelson Poynter had predicted: the alliance 
between OW! and the censor made the studio s shy away from significant 
37 theme s, .
By fall 1943 Bell had convinced every studio except Paramount 
to  let OW! read � their scripts instead of certain a.elected ones,  and 
even Paramount agreed to discuss its scripts with OWI in general terms. 
In 1943 OWI read 466 scripts, in 1944, 744, The 1, 210 scripts reviewed 
in those two years represented almo st three -fourths of the 1, 652 scripts 
the Hollywood office read between May 1942 and its demise in August 1945. 
From September 1943 through August 1944 BMP analyzed 84 scripts with 
American lawle ssnes s  or corruption as a main theme; 47 were corrected 
to its satisfaction. (Mo st of the unr evised films were westerns, the sole 
remaining disagreement between BMP and the censor . ) Racial problems 
wer e corrected or eliminated in 20 of 24 instances, distortions of military 
or political facts in 44 of 59 cases.  Fifty-nine of  the 80 scripts that 
portrayed Americans oblivious of the war were improved, During this 
period OWI managed to have 277 of the 390 cases of objectionable material 
corrected, a success ratio of 71 percent. Y et these  statistics under state 
OWI's influence, Many scripts already showed the influence of the 1 1Manual 
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for the Motion Picture Industry" when they reached OWI reader s, making 
alterations unneces sary, Nor do these figure s  indicate the effect of the 
bureau' s  moral suasion, Complete statistics are not available, but from 
January through August 1943 (before Bell ' s  agreement with the censor had 
much effect), BMP induced the industry to drcp 29 scheduled p).'.oductions 
and, particularly noteworthy, to reshoot part s of five films already 
approved by the censor, B ell closed the remaining gaps in the line 
established by Mellett and Poynter, From mid-1943 until the end of the 
war OWI exerted an influence over an American mass medium never 
equaled before or since by a government agency. 38 The content of World
War II motion pictures is inexplicable without reference to the bureau. 
Hollywood had proved to be remarkably compliant, The ·industry 
found that its sincere desir e to help the war effort need not interfere with 
busines s  that was better than usual, Freedom of the screen had never 
been Hollywood's long suit: an industry that had feared being "enslaved"' 
by Lowell Mellett was already in thrall to Will Hays, As the studios 
learned that OWI wanted "only to be helpful, their attitudes change[ d]  
miraculously," obs erved Robert Riskin, a Sherwood aide who had been 
one of Hollywood' s highest-paid writers, In "brutal hone sty, 11 Riskin 
continued, the industry ' s  "unprec edented profits" had encouraged coopera-
tion that surprised even the movie moguls. The studios let BMP know 
what stories they were considering for production - - some of the hottest 
secrets in movieland - - so that the bureau could steer them into les s 
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crowded areas and thus smooth out the picture cycle, OWI' s international 
role was especially important, Hollywood films hit the beaches right 
behind American troops, provided they had OWI approval; the agency 
charged admis sion and held the money in trust for the studios, United 
States film maker s  were planning a large - scale invasion of the foreign 
market after the war� and OWI established indispensable beachheads, 
OWI assured Hollywood that "every effort would be made to protect their 
interests, 1 1  said Riskin, Indeed, he lamented in mid-1944, 11an unsavory 
opinion seems to prevail within OWI that the Motion Picture Bureau is 
unduly concerned with considerations for commercial interests, 1 1 39
Although OWI and Hollywood first seemed to conflict,. they 
eventually developed excellent rapport, for their aims and approaches 
wete essentially compatible, "The. chief function of mas s  culture," 
Robert War show has obs erved, 1 1is to relieve one of the necessity of 
experiencing one ' s life directly, 1 1 Hollywood, conceiving of its audience 
as  pas sive, emphasized entertainment and avoidance of is sues, OWI 
encouraged Hollywood to treat more social issues and to move beyond 
national and racial stereotypes, However, since OWI was interested 
\ 
mainly in response, it stres sed ideology and affirmation; it raised social 
is sues only to have democracy wash them away. Here was where the 
s eemingly divergent paths of Hollywood and OWI joined: av.oidance and 
affirmation both led to evasion of experience, Instead of opening realms 
of understanding by confronting experience, OWI the propaganda agency 
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and Hollywood the dream factory joined hands to produce what Agee 
termed 1 1acts of seduction" and "benign enslavement. 1 1  Howev'er
laudable the goals of propaganda, Jacques Ellul has suggested that it 
creates a person J lwho is not at ease except when integrated in the 
mas s, who r ej ects critical ju�gments, choiceu, and differentiations 
because he clings to clear certaintie s ,  J I  40 Through their influence
over motion pictures,  the Office of War Information liberals under -
mined the liberation for which they said they fought, 
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